会计与财务[2016年第1期] 公司治理与内幕交易获利能力研究

发布时间:2018-12-01

作者:Lili Dai, Renhui Fu, Jun-Koo Kang, and Inmoo Lee

关键字:Corporategovernance;Insiderpurchases;sales;Profitabilityofinsidertrading;Legalrisk

摘要/Abstract

This paper examines the influence of corporate governance systems on insidersability to profit from their information advantage and the ways through which corporate governance systems influence such ability. We find that corporate governance significantly reduces the profitability of insider sales but not that of insider purchases. Given that sales involve greater legal risk than purchases, the results suggest that well-governed firms restrict informed insider trading mainly to reduce legal risk. We also find that better-governed firms reduce the profitability of insider sales by increasing the likelihood of adopting ex-ante preventive measures (e.g., voluntary insider trading restriction policies), implementing such measures more effectively, and taking ex-post disciplinary actions more actively. These results highlight how better-governed firms are able to restrict insiders from exploiting private information.

  

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