2020年7月28日学术报告通知

发布时间:2020-07-28

【内容提要】We examine the desirability of accounting uniformity in a setting where investors allocate investment across firms with heterogeneous productivity. We show that without regulation, firms’voluntary choices of accounting methods may not lead to suboptimal resource allocation and social value. We then examine the optimal level of accounting standards uniformity a social planner would choose to measure productivity for all firms in the economy. We find that increasing uniformity does not necessarily increase comparability; However, at its optimal level, increasing uniformity increases comparability. We also find that the optimal level of uniformity is positively related to firm heterogeneity and negatively related to common uncertainty, and we provide other comparative statics results. We examine several extensions of the model, including an extension in which only the most productive firms are funded, and an extension in which managers have reporting discretion. Our results provide a micro-foundation for the distinction and relation between uniformity and comparability and their distinct effects on resource allocation efficiency.